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Abstract
This study utilises higher objectives postulated in Islamic moral economy or the maqasid al-Shari’ah theoretical frame-
work’s novel approach in evaluating the ethical, social, environmental and financial performance of Islamic banks. Maqasid 
al-Shari’ah is interpreted as achieving social good as a consequence in addition to well-being and, hence, it goes beyond 
traditional (voluntary) social responsibility. This study also explores the major determinants that affect maqasid performance 
as expressed through disclosure analysis. By expanding the traditional maqasid al-Shari’ah,, we develop a comprehensive 
evaluation framework in the form of a maqasid index, which is subjected to a rigorous disclosure analysis. Furthermore, in 
identifying the main determinants of the maqasid disclosure performance, panel data analysis is used by including several 
key variables alongside political and socio-economic environment, ownership structures, and corporate and Shari’ah gov-
ernance-related factors. The sample includes 33 full-fledged Islamic banks from 12 countries for the period of 2008–2016. 
The findings show that although during the nine-year period the disclosure of maqasid performance of the sampled Islamic 
banks has improved, this is still short of ‘best practices’. Through panel data analysis, this study finds that the Muslim 
population indicator, CEO duality, Shari’ah governance, and leverage variables positively impact the disclosure of maqasid 
performance. However, the effect of GDP, financial development and human development index of the country, its political 
and civil rights, institutional ownership, and a higher share of independent directors have an overall negative impact on the 
maqasid performance. The findings reported in this study identify complex and multi-faceted relations between external 
market realities, corporate and Shari’ah governance mechanisms, and maqasid performance.
Keywords Islamic moral economy · Maqasid al-Shari’ah · Ethical performance · Islamic banks · Disclosure · Determinants
Introduction
Islamic banking and financial institutions (IBFIs) emerged 
during the mid-1970s as ‘commercial banks’ to fulfil the 
religiously constructed financial needs of individual Mus-
lims. They are considered value-oriented financial institu-
tions shaped by the principles, morals and ethical norms 
of Islam. While the legal rulings in the form of Shari’ah 
injunctions determine the operational nature of IBFIs in the 
form of compliance, the normative nature of their operations 
is determined by the precepts of an Islamic Moral Economy 
(IME) (Asutay 2012). As a result, IBFIs are expected fulfil 
the normative expectations of IME as articulated by maqasid 
al-Shari’ah or ‘objectives of the Shari’ah’ (Asutay 2013; 
Asutay and Yilmaz 2018), which is defined as ‘promoting 
human and social well-being’ (Chapra 2000).
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The emergence of IBFIs was expected to motivate the 
socio-economic development of Muslim countries as institu-
tions of IME by serving the financial needs of Muslim peo-
ple in accordance with Islamic legal or Shari’ah principles, 
as IME emerged to construct a human-centred economic 
development paradigm. However, while IBFIs have been 
successful in mobilizing financial resources, they have been 
subjected to heavy criticism on the grounds that they are 
not fulfilling the ‘substance’ or the maqasid (objectives) of 
Shari’ah or ‘human and social well-being’ as identified by 
IME’s transformational framework.
Despite the dynamic growth of the Islamic finance indus-
try both in asset terms (1893.10 billion USD in 2016) and 
number (360) of IBs (The Banker 2017), the current prac-
tices of Islamic Banks (IBs) have been strongly criticised 
as not being truly ‘Islamic’ in their operations (El-Gamal 
2006; Khan 2010; Asutay 2007a, b, 2012; Aksak and Asutay 
2015). To compete with conventional financial institutions, 
IBFIs have oriented their strategies towards financial objec-
tives rather than ethical and social objectives that require 
them to serve communities rather than contributing to finan-
cialization. The increasing financialization can be seen with 
the increased use of debt instruments as well as financing 
provided for financial markets and banks along with other 
activities which has financialisation consequences (on finan-
cialisation and debt orientation, see among others: Aggrawal 
and Yousef 2000; Nagaoka 2007; Asutay 2007a, b, 2012; 
Rudnyckyj 2014, 2018; Suzuki and Miah 2015; Farooq and 
Selim 2018; Yilmaz 2018). For example, in Malaysia, the 
use of organised tawarruq, which is a short-term liquidity 
solution within the Islamic sphere, has increased by 104 per-
cent between 2014 and 2016 (Bank Nagara Malaysia 2016, 
pp. 90–91). The nature of organised tawarruq creates debt 
and increased further financialisation, and therefore is sub-
jected to strong criticism, which was, therefore, ruled unlaw-
ful or Shari’ah non-compliant by the International Islamic 
Fiqh Academy but it is used liberally by the majority of 
Islamic banks due to market pressure, as indicated by the 
statistics in the case of Malaysia.
Contextually, in the IME-based operational axioms 
through which IBFIs can operate, they have adopted neo-
classical assumptions and pragmatic attitudes and have 
therefore shifted away from the IME framework (Asutay 
2007a). Consequently, IBs have ‘failed’ in achieving their 
social objectives as required by the IME foundations (Asutay 
2012) and in the implementation of maqasid al-Shari’ah 
into their activities, in particular in social impact areas.
Considering that essential economic and social issues are 
still on the agenda of most of the Muslim countries world-
wide, such as poverty reduction and enhancing levels of 
human development, IBFIs are expected to contribute to the 
ethical, social and economic spheres to realise the maqasid 
al-Shari’ah or social well-being. Therefore, it is crucial to 
assess the performance of Islamic banks (IBs) through the 
‘higher objectives’ or the maqasid al-Shari’ah theoreti-
cal framework and identify factors which could positively 
or negatively influence IBs’ ethical, social and economic 
performance. This will help to determine how IBs should 
be directed and operated in fulfilling the multidimensional 
objective of IBs and satisfy both the ‘form’ (Shari’ah legal 
rulings) as well as the ‘substance’ (social and moral filters) 
requirements of the Islamic worldview (Asutay 2012, pp. 
98–99).
Since the theoretical framework of IME implies that 
IBs should conduct their financial operations in an ethical 
manner with social impact consequences, this study aims to 
fill the gap by going beyond the classical corporate social 
responsibility measures to assess their ‘social and ethical 
responsibility’. In doing so, this study approaches the mat-
ter through the embedded notion of Islamic morality by 
developing a maqasid index to measure the endogenously 
constructed social or ethical behaviour of IBs. The evalua-
tion of IBs’ maqasid performance across 12 countries within 
the nine-year time frame (2008–2016) is studied to explore 
the determinants of maqasid performance consisting of the 
ethical, social and economic performance of the IBs. As a 
result, this research advances extant literature concerning 
the performance of IBs beyond financial performance and 
their determinants in relation to the normatively expressed 
objectives including their contribution to social development 
in their operating countries and communities.
This study also provides empirical evidence as to whether 
or not distinct corporate governance (CG) structures are 
affected by the maqasid al-Shari’ah’s aspirational founda-
tions within the IME framework and whether they perform 
better than other IFBIs, vis-à-vis CG, in areas of ethical, 
social and economic affairs. At the same time, the ethical, 
social and economic performance of IFBIs are also affected 
by external macro-factors and their environment, as exam-
ined in this study.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first extended 
research to provide a cross-country empirical analysis of 
the factors which influence the performance of IBs in ful-
filling the objectives within the maqasid al-Shari’ah theo-
retical framework through data gathered utilising disclosure 
analysis. Asutay and Hernangitas (2015) provided the initial 
descriptive study using a similar maqasid index, which this 
study applied as a basis for developing the current maqasid 
index utilised to generate the necessary data for assessing 
the maqasid performance of the sampled banks.
This study has, therefore, potential policy implications 
that can contribute to the work of national regulators, gov-
ernment authorities, and international standard setting 
organizations, such as the IFSB and AAOIFI, in constructing 
and developing appropriate mechanisms and best practices 
for the Islamic finance industry in improving IB performance 
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to contribute to the development of communities and socie-
ties, which is essentialised by maqasid al-Shari’ah as the 
foundational objective function and methodology of IME. 
This study also contributes to the academic literature on 
Islamic finance by exploring factors which could influence 
the maqasid performance of IBs, and thus it discovers ways 
to enhance IBs by improving their maqasid performance 
with the idea that IBs should contribute to the socio-eco-
nomic development of societies and countries in which they 
operate.
Overall, this study provides a novel approach and under-
standing of evaluating the social performance of IBs beyond 
merely replicating or mimicking CSR or corporate govern-
ance-related disclosure indices, as it develops an authentic 
evaluation method specific to IME as expressed through 
extended maqasid al-Shari’ah principles. It is hoped that 
such a method that is inherently Islamic in nature can prevail 
as a novel method in the literature.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: a litera-
ture review on IME-based maqasid al-Shari’ah theoreti-
cal framework is presented in “Maqasid al-Shari’ah as the 
Ethical Framework for Islamic Banks” section. In “Islamic 
Banking and Finance and Its Ideal Identities” section, 
Islamic banking and finance and its ideal identities are dis-
cussed. “Survey of the Empirical Literature” section pre-
sents a survey of relevant empirical studies, while “Method-
ology” section provides a detailed description and procedure 
of research methodology including maqasid index construc-
tion and details of disclosure analysis, hypotheses formu-
lation and method of analysis is employed. The empirical 
results relating to the maqasid performance of IBs with their 
determining factors are presented in “Empirical Results of 
Assessing the Maqasid Performance of Islamic Banks and 
Its Determinants” section. Finally, “Conclusion” section 
summarises the findings and provides the conclusion of the 
study which also offers a critical reflection on some of the 
more outstanding and pertinent issues.
Maqasid al‑Shari’ah as the Ethical 
Framework for Islamic Banks
The ideal objective of IBs and their performance cannot be 
explored properly without discussing a theoretical frame-
work of IME, which rationalises the existence of IBs. The 
IME-related debate emerged in the 1960s as a critique of 
both the capitalist and communist models of economic 
development, which ignores religious and ethical values, 
whereas, the primary objective of IME is to develop an 
economic system that would be human-centric and based 
on Islamic values and guided by the substantive justice of 
Islam (Asutay 2007a, p. 169). As a result of the knowledge 
creation process led by Muslim economists, the conceptual 
foundations of IME, its axioms, value system, operational 
dimensions and the behavioural norms of individual Mus-
lims (‘homoislamicus’) have been developed based on the 
ontology and epistemology of Islam, namely, the Quran 
and Sunnah (Asutay 2007a, p. 171, 2007b, p. 5).
Asutay (2007b; 2012; 2013) summarizes the founda-
tional axioms of IME, which include the following:
Tawhid as complementarity and unitarity or God’s 
unity and sovereignty, constitutes the nature of 
knowledge and its articulation implying that none of 
the stakeholders can have dominance over the others. 
This identifies that IME suggests an extended stake-
holder governance system for IBs based on ihsan or 
equilibrium. For example, the prohibition of riba 
accordingly implies de-centring of capital and bring-
ing capital to the same level with other stakeholers 
through the ihsani process.
Al-adl wa’l-ihsan refers to socio-economic justice 
and beneficence to establish equilibrium between the 
interests of all the stakeholders in an intergenera-
tional and intragenerational manner, which defines 
the objective function of IBs. When justice cannot 
establish equal access, then ihsan through its balanc-
ing nature aims to overcome exclusion and fairness.
Rububiyyah refers to a developmentalist path in the 
form of divine arrangements for nourishment, suste-
nance and guidance towards perfection, which identi-
fies the operational objectives of IBs. It implies that 
all the stakeholders have a given path for develop-
ment, and therefore, such development path must be 
sustained through the opportunity spaces.
Tazkiyah implies growth in harmony within tawhid’s 
complementarity so that interests of all stakehold-
ers can be served without harming any other, which 
implies a constraint on the operation of IBs.
Khilafah or vicegerency and accountability defines 
the role of humans in such an extended stakeholder 
governance; and
Maqasid al-Shari’ah, or the higher objectives of 
Islam, implies ‘well-being’ indicating that whatever 
action is taken and whatever is done should be in line 
with the well-being all of the stakeholders including 
human well-being.
Based on such foundational axioms, IME as a system, 
in a consequential manner, “refers to economic and sus-
tainable development, social justice and social investing-
oriented principles” (Asutay 2012, p. 96). Therefore, it 
can be argued that an effective IME system requires that 
IBs conduct their activities in accordance with the princi-
ples of maqasid with an emphasis on social and economic 
dimensions by essentialising and adopting sustainable 
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development practices along with fulfilling Islamic fiqhi 
or jurisprudential requirements.
Give that the foundational axioms are constructed by the 
maqasid al-Shari’ah methodological base of IME, which 
provides the legal and moral rationale and the theoretical 
framework within which economic activities should be 
performed (Asutay 2007b, p. 8; Asutay and Yilmaz 2018). 
Despite the existence of several different views of maqasid 
al-Shari’ah, a common treatment summarises it as the ‘reali-
zation of well-being of all the stakeholders’ (Asutay 2012, 
p. 96). The most common reference to maqasid in Islamic 
economics is given to the Ghazalian definition of maqasid, 
which is interpreted as ‘human well-being’ and articulated 
as “safeguarding their faith (dīn), their self (nafs), their intel-
lect (‘aql), their posterity (nasl), and their wealth (māl)” (Al 
Ghazali 1937; as cited in Chapra 2008, pp. 5–6) in consti-
tuting the IME axioms (Asutay and Yilmaz 2018). Chapra 
(2008) argues that while these five objectives could be con-
sidered primary, there are other necessary corollaries which 
can be found in the Qur’an, the Sunnah or in the writings of 
different Shari’ah scholars. Moreover, all primary objectives 
along with their corollaries are important, as “they are all 
interdependent and play the role of supporting each other” 
(Chapra 2008, p. 50). The Ghazalian definition of maqasid 
is, however, criticised for its individual-oriented objectives 
and its lack of social consideration (Auda 2007; Asutay and 
Yilmaz 2018). Among others, Siddiqi (2004), Auda (2007), 
Asutay (2007b) argue that maqasid should include wider 
issues such as justice and equity. Asutay and Yilmaz (2018), 
therefore, state that in order to develop into a comprehensive 
methodology of IME, maqasid al-Shari’ah should be taken 
away from the constraints of fiqh, while in terms of a tawhidi 
nature of knowledge must also be complemented by a moral 
base so that policy oriented consequences can be developed. 
In providing such a frame, Asutay and Yilmaz (2018) along 
with Siddiqi (2004) and Auda (2007) re-interpret maqasid to 
include a dynamic nature rather than ‘safeguarding’ or ‘pro-
tection’, and the non-limitation of objectives so that it will 
better conceptualize and handle contemporary issues beyond 
a narrow Ghazalian frame. Therefore, Asutay and Yilmaz 
(2018), among others, highlight that Ghazalian maqasid is 
not able to respond to the contemporary challenges in the 
operations of IBs in relation to IME’s normative world. In 
responding to such concerns, this study refers to ‘invigora-
tion’ rather than ‘safeguarding’ as part of Chapra’s (2008) 
redefinition of maqasid.
Contrary to a Ghazalian view on the articulation of 
maqasid al-Shari’ah, with an attempt to respond to Siddiqi 
(2004), Auda (2007) and Asutay and Yilmaz’s (2018) re-
interpretation, Al-Najjar extended the maqasid based on four 
objectives and eight corollaries, as identified by Bedoui and 
Mansour (2014, p. 13), which is depicted in Table 1. How-
ever, Bedoui (2012, p. 5) points out that implementation of 
the corollary objectives is also required since the realization 
of the primary objectives may be onerous without them. 
Therefore, all eight maqasid corollaries should constitute 
the framework for a full assessment of IBs’ social reference 
as an endogenously constructed frame based on Islamic 
ontology. In other words, through such a re-interpretation 
and extended maqasid as a dynamic construct beyond a 
safeguarding role, an embedded IME frame is constituted 
for the IBs to operate within (Asutay and Yilmaz 2018). In 
this, embeddedness refers to IBs operating within the social 
formation of an Islamic normative world rather than the 
mechanisms and instruments of a market system.
Islamic Banking and Finance and Its Ideal 
Identities
The creation of the first IBs in the 1970s represented the 
emergence of an alternative financial industry, which was 
expected to conduct its activities according to Shari’ah or 
Islamic legal requirements and the substantive morality 
promulgated by Islam. In relation to the IME framework, 
Asutay (2007a, p. 172) described Islamic finance as “an 
institutional aspect of Islamic economics which finances 
and regulates economic activity” to promote the economic 
development and well-being of all creatures, including 
human well-being through social justice. Therefore, IBs have 
emerged in response to expectations to operationalise IME.
Consequently, based on the IME theoretical framework, 
several ideals and principles have been advanced as key 
charecteristics of IBs. Among others, Chapra (1985, pp. 
154–156) outlined several distinctive features of IBs, which 
include the abolition of interest, an orientation towards pub-
lic interest, a universal or multi-purpose nature and not rep-
resenting purely commercial or conventional banks but being 
catalysts for economic development through profit-and-loss 
Table 1  Najjar’s concept of Maqasid al-Shariah. Source Adapted 
from Bedoui and Mansour (2014, pp. 567–568); modified version
Maqasid al-Shari’ah Corollaries
(i) Invigorating the value of human life
(a) Faith
(b) Human rights
(ii) Invigorating the human self
(a) Self
(b) Intellect
(iii) Invigorating society
(a) Posterity
(b) Social entity
(iv) Invigorating the physical environment
(a) Wealth
(b) Environment (ecology)
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sharing (PLS), and risk sharing principles with the objective 
of fulfilling social and economic justice, aiding the fair and 
impartial allocation of wealth and emancipating and empow-
ering all the stakeholders.
In accordance with the IME’s holistic approach, Asutay 
(2012) classified four characteristics of the values and norms 
of the ideal IB:
(i) As Islamic finance principles are derived from the 
ontology of Islam, the operations of IBs should not derive 
from riba (interest-based transactions), gharar (gambling), 
and speculative transactions, nor from the production of 
goods and services that violate Islamic norms (Ayub 2007) 
so that the interest of all the stakeholders should be posi-
tively considered by de-centring the hegemony of capital. 
Therefore, IBs in their operations are expected to endogenise 
the interests of all stakeholders beyond narrow shareholder 
maximisation objectives.
(ii) Based on Islamic values and norms, IB activities 
should be akin to ethical investing beyond just eliminating 
riba and gharar. At the same time, PLS-based financial con-
tracts are encouraged in the form of mudharabah and mush-
arakah or equity financing which will promote the devel-
opment of entrepreneurial activities and greater stability in 
financial markets (Mirakhor and Zaidi 2007). Furthermore, 
the ‘two-tier mudharabah model’ was argued to be an ideal 
model of IBs as it “would fulfil the overall objectives of 
Shari’ah and achieve growth, equity and stability” (Ahmed 
2011a, p. 73).
(iii) IB operations are based on asset-backed transactions 
as an articulation of their embedded financing proposition to 
link the monetary and real economy along with promoting 
stability, productivity and economic development (Iqbal and 
Molyneux 2005, p. 31).
(iv) As an IME aims to promote social justice, IBs are 
expected to endogenise socially oriented expectations with 
the aim to serve communities and not only ‘markets’ (Asutay 
2012). Therefore, IBs are expected to serve the financial 
needs of all market segments, including small/micro-enter-
prises (SME) and the poor (Ahmed 2011b, p. 153). In addi-
tion, concepts such as waqf, zakah, sadaqah and qard hassan 
reflect the social dimensions of Islamic frameworks, and 
which is expected to also be presented in IBs’ corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) practices (Platonova 2013).
According to the above ideal values within the IME 
framework beyond the financialised meaning of IBs, the 
ethical, social and economic dimensions are essentialised 
in IB operations as endogenous constructs rather than exter-
nally adopted principles. By definition, these correspond to 
maqasid al-Shari’ah consequences. Therefore, consider-
ing that the maqasid constitutes the main construct of IBs 
in articulating IME in their operations, it is important to 
assess the performance of IBs through the prism of these 
dimensions so that the proximity of their performance to 
the essentialised embedded nature can be identified beyond 
instrumentalised morality through exception-based moral-
ity essentialised by fiqhi forms as prevalent in the IB sector 
(Sencal and Asutay 2019).
Survey of the Empirical Literature
This section aims to present a review of the relevant empiri-
cal literature by clustering according to their objectives.
Ethical, Social and Financial Performance of Islamic 
Banking and Financial Institutions
In contrast to classical views on the performance assessment 
of financial institutions which are based mainly on finan-
cial and economic measures, a performance view in light 
of the maqasid al-Shari’ah is multidimensional and has a 
wider scope with the purpose of enhancing and sustaining 
human and societal well-being (Bedoui and Mansour 2014). 
However, Mohammed et al. (2008) argue that the failure of 
academic scholars to construct the multidimensional objec-
tives for IBs has left no choice but to adopt the conventional 
unidimensional benchmarks of financial indicators to evalu-
ate the performance of IBs. Therefore, performance assess-
ment models and criteria are important to link IB activities 
with maqasid al-Shari’ah objectives in the context of IME.
To fill the gap in performance measurement-related theo-
retical frameworks, several studies have been conducted. For 
example, Hameed et al. (2004) developed the ‘Islamicity 
Disclosure Index’, which consists of Shari’ah compliance, 
CG and social/environmental indicators, and some financial 
ratios. In addition, Mohammed et al. (2008) constructed per-
formance ratios for assessing the achievements of IBs in nine 
dimensions and ultimately covered three objectives includ-
ing educating individuals, establishing justice and promoting 
welfare. Furthermore, Ngalim et al. (2015) has developed 
an ‘Islamic Vision for Development’ based indicators for 
the assessment of the maqasid al-Shari’ah of IBs in light of 
the five Ghazalian maqasid with supplementary corollaries. 
In addition to maqasid al-Shari’ah performance measure-
ment frameworks, some studies analysed the ethical iden-
tity of IBs through CSR-based disclosure analysis based on 
annual reports, such as Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) and Belal 
et al. (2014). Moreover, Kasri and Ahmed (2015), in their 
attempt to develop operational indicators for a maqasid-
based multidimensional poverty measure, included merely 
21 items over five dimensions. In another attempt, Amir-Ud-
Din (2014:25), using the fiqhi classification, “developed a 
Maqasid al-Shari’ah Index (MSI) corresponding to three lev-
els of necessities, complementarities and embellishments”, 
while this study is mainly related to expressed morality in 
terms of IME rather than ‘rational-legal reasoning’ provided 
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by fiqh. In developing a structural model for human develop-
ment, Mili (2014) utilises Ghazalian maqasid by adding a 
further dimension that is ‘human well-being’ resulting into 
six dimensions and 15 elements. In addition, with the objec-
tive of developing policy oriented maqasid index, Hasan 
and Ali (2018) constructs a maqasid al-Shari’ah depriva-
tion perception index (MSDPI) for the Muslim countries 
utilising five dimensional Ghazalian maqasid index with 26 
deprivation-related consequences to evidence the impact of 
the lack of such maqasid on human well-being. Despite the 
resemblances and utilising similar constructs, the methodo-
logical frameworks and measurements used in these attempts 
do not cover all the aspects of maqasid and they remain 
within the methodology and framework of CSRs applied to 
conventional banks. Therefore, a comprehensive and inte-
grated maqasid index should be developed as attempted by 
this study, which covers an important gap in the literature.
In terms of the evaluation of actual ethical performance, 
several empirical studies provided evidence that while IBs 
achieve significant financial performance, they perform 
poorly in ethical and social dimensions targeted by IME. 
Asutay (2012) concluded that, based on empirical research, 
it can be claimed that there is a ‘social failure’ of IBs as a 
result of their shift from IME’s equity-based objective to the 
neo-classical objective of efficiency.
In evidencing this, a number of benchmarks can be uti-
lised. For example, in contrast to the ideal PLS or ‘equi-
ty’-based financial contracts, IBs currently heavily utilize 
debt financing instruments, which has been referred to as 
the ‘murabahah syndrome’ (Yousef 2004). Among others, 
Nagaoka (2007) and Asutay (2012) demonstrate the domi-
nance of debt-based Islamic instruments in the operations of 
Islamic banks, accounting for over 90% of their financing. 
As a result, more stakeholders perceive that the financing 
methods of IBs are the same as those of conventional banks, 
which provide debt financing deploying different mechanics.
Second, despite their impact on economic growth, the 
performance of IBs has not promoted the economic and 
social development of the communities they serve. Aksak 
and Asutay (2015) pointed out that the GCC countries, 
which themselves have a dynamic economic growth and a 
high level of wealth per capita in general, have failed in their 
human development. They showed that IBs have not helped 
in contributing to such objectives as part of their maqasid 
efforts. Therefore, it is claimed that IBs have not fulfilled 
the aspirations of IME in socio-economic developmental-
ist areas or embedding their operations within the maqasid 
frame.
Third, the IME paradigm provides a rationale for CSR 
as a social responsibility towards society and extends it 
through maqasid expectations. In contrast, according to 
several empirical studies, IBs have failed in their CSR prac-
tices. For example, among others, Sairally (2007), Haniffa 
and Hudaib (2007), Platonova (2013) and Belal et al. (2014) 
found that most IBs conduct only zakah distribution and 
other charitable activities without a systemic approach 
towards CSR. Thus, the social performance is a weak area 
in IB performance indicating dis-embeddedness in relation 
to the maqasid al-Shari’ah defined objectives.
Maqasid frame and IME identifies that IBs are expected 
to have the best practices and a comprehensive CG frame-
work. According to Choudhury and Hoque (2006), tawhidi 
or shuratic models of CG have wider groups of stakeholders 
in comparison with Anglo-Saxon and even European mod-
els. Nevertheless, currently IBs have not developed distinct 
CG structures which continue to utilize shareholder-oriented 
models; therefore, Chapra and Ahmed (2002) identified that 
IBs do not protect the interests of all stakeholders. In relation 
to Shari’ah governance (SG), Hassan (2012) identified that 
there are no ‘best practices’ in SG, which could lead to the 
deterioration of Shari’ah dimensions in IB operations and 
therefore increase Shari’ah non-compliance risks.
Based on the stated empirical evidence, it can be argued 
IBs have not met the expectations of Islamic economists and 
Muslims in general, which is further substantiated by El-
Gamal (2006: xii) who stated that “Islamic finance has argu-
ably failed to serve the objectives of Islamic law (maqasid 
al-Shari’ah)”. Therefore, it is important to develop an 
empirical framework based on maqasid to test the observed 
shortcomings in the ethical and social performance of IBs in 
the context of maqasid al-Shari’ah by adopting an extended 
maqasid frame beyond the Ghazalian framework, as dis-
cussed above.
Determinants of Islamic Banks’ Performance 
and Disclosures
Despite the dynamic growth of IBs in asset size and the 
complexity of their operations, few studies have addressed 
questions regarding the determinants of the financial, ethi-
cal, social and environmental performance of IBs, which 
is essentialised by the maqasid al-Shari’ah frame within 
the scope of Islamic finance, including both the institutional 
or socio-political context as well as organizational features. 
However, most of the empirical studies have explored only 
determinants of financial performance and the development 
of IBs. For example, Gazdar and Grassa (2015) identified 
the positive influence of macroeconomic factors, such as 
income per capita, economic openness and population, for 
Islamic finance in GCC countries while institutional factors 
were not considered relevant to the development of IBs. In 
another study, Mollah and Zaman (2015) investigated the 
positive influence of Shari’ah supervisory boards (SSB) on 
financial performance, and they found that corporate gov-
ernance attributes, such as the board of directors’ size, inde-
pendence and its CEO, overall negatively impact IB financial 
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performance. In focusing on ownership, Zouari and Taktak 
(2012) trace family and government ownership of IBs with 
higher financial performance while institutional and foreign 
shareholders do not have such influence on IBs.
In relation to the ethical, social and environmental dimen-
sions, most studies have explored the determinants of the 
social and ethical reporting of IBs. Farook et al. (2011) 
report that the relative size of Muslim populations, the level 
of social and political freedom, the SSB, and the share of 
investment account holders (IAHs) to total assets positively 
influence CSR disclosure.
In addition, Yousef’s (2004) cross-country analysis of 
‘murabahah syndrome’ showed that legal institutions and 
political factors significantly influence the prevalence of 
debt-based instruments over equity-based ones in Islamic 
finance. As a result, Yousef (2004, p. 76) expects “that over-
all institutional environment will be a more important deter-
minant of the evolution of financial structures in Muslim 
societies than … rigid religious interpretations”.
In conclusion, the IBs, as institutions of IME, are 
expected to emphasize their socio-economic role in society 
by enhancing their economic, social, ethical and environ-
mental performance. However, as mentioned in the above-
presented studies, there is a gap in the current practices of 
IBs with regard to their ideal behaviour. Moreover, there 
is a lack of research in relation to the determinants of the 
economic, social, ethical and environmental performance 
of IBs. As a result, further empirical studies are required to 
determine the factors affecting the performance of IBs in 
light of maqasid al-Shari’ah, a task this study aims to fulfil 
in this paper.
Methodology
The empirical research in this paper is framed using a mix of 
qualitative and quantitative data based on the content analy-
sis of annual reports for the generation of disclosure-related 
data for maqasid corollaries to identify the ethical perfor-
mance of the sampled Islamic banks. In addition, secondary 
data were collected to identify the determining factors of 
disclosure performance through panel data analysis.
In conducting the content analysis for generating disclo-
sure-related data, a crucial step is the design of specific cat-
egories or pre-determined keywords and their criteria into 
which content units of documents and texts can be attributed 
(Haniffa and Hudaib 2007). The categories and list of indica-
tors for this research were designed mainly from the existing 
literature on the concept of the maqasid al-Shari’ah and its 
measurement of the performance of IBs, ethical and social 
reporting as well as ‘the best practices’ from Islamic and 
conventional finance.
The unit of analysis is the annual reports of the sampled 
banks, the contents of which are attributed to the maqasid 
dimensions. The generated disclosure data were converted 
into measurable categories.
In analysing the text through content analysis, the 
maqasid al-Shari’ah index was constructed and used as a 
benchmark. To mitigate any possible bias in scoring items 
during index calculation, an un-weighted approach was used 
to be consistent with previous studies, such as Belal et al. 
(2014) and Haniffa and Hudaib (2007). In the calculation of 
the maqasid al-Shari’ah index with all its sub-indices, as per 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2007), a mainly dichotomous approach 
was used in the sense that an item scored ‘1’ if it was found 
in the annual report and ‘0’ (zero) if it could not be found in 
the annual report.
Following estimations of the maqasid al-Shari’ah index 
and its dimensions as dependent variables, in the second part 
of the empirical analysis a linear regression model based 
on panel data was utilised to explore the impact of several 
independent variables of the disclosure performance.
Construction of maqasid al‑Shari’ah Index: 
Composition and List of Indicators for Disclosure 
Analysis
For the purposes of designing the evaluative framework 
for the maqasid or ethical performance of the sampled IBs 
through disclosure analysis, Najjar’s extended maqasid 
framework is implemented with four primary objectives 
and eight corollaries, as discussed in Bedoui and Mansour 
(2014). However, to link practice-related indicators of the 
economic, social, ethical and environmental performance of 
IBs with theoretically developed maqasid al-Shari’ah objec-
tives and corollaries, Sekaran’s (2000) method is utilized. 
Accordingly, ‘concepts and notions’ can be broken down 
into observable characteristics or ‘dimensions’, and, subse-
quently, they can be divided into measurable behaviours or 
‘elements.’ In line with Mohammed et al. (2008), ‘elements’ 
are separated into a list of indicators of various performance 
ratios. Therefore, a comprehensive evaluative framework in 
relation to the maqasid al-Shari’ah framework is presented 
in Fig. 1, which is utilised in the empirical analysis.
Based on the existing literature, such as ethical per-
formance by Belal et al. (2014), along with current ‘best 
practices’ in both Islamic and conventional finance (for 
example AAOIFI, IFSB and others), as well as macro and 
micro-level maqasid indicators developed by Mohamed 
(2018), a comprehensive list of benchmark performance 
indicators is constructed which are then traced to each 
‘element’, to each ‘dimension’ and then ultimately to each 
‘concept’ or maqasid objective. The index in its fullness 
is presented in “Appendix”. It should be noted that not all 
performance indicators from the above-mentioned sources 
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are utilised as only relevant indicators are included in the 
list. In quantifying, most indicators are scored based on 
a ‘dichotomous approach’: a score of ‘1’ is given if the 
indicator is found in the annual report and ‘0’ is given if 
not (Belal et al. 2014). In addition, some indicators are 
calculated based on ratios or other financial calculations.
To measure the overall maqasid performance of IBs and 
their separate performance in each primary objective, a 
maqasid al-Shariah index with sub-indices in each corol-
lary is constructed. As mentioned above, the calculation 
of the index is based on an un-weighted approach and all 
indicators were weighted equally in each element’s groups 
to control possible bias in the measurement of maqasid 
performance of the sampled IBs in line with previous 
studies such as Haniffa and Hudaib (2007). It should be 
noted that Antonio et al. (2012) used a weighted approach, 
which is not considered in this study due to its heavily sub-
jective nature, as he constructed the weights through the 
interviews with the Shari’ah scholar. In addition, Moqbel 
(2014) in his research referred to the frequency of each of 
the MSI dimensions mentioned in the Qur’an is determin-
ing the weightage. However, tawhid axiom of the IME 
being complementarity within unitarity suggests that each 
dimension of MSI should be considered equally, as assign-
ing different weights will essentialise certain dimensions 
on other by creating dominance. Tawhid by definition pre-
vents any domination of any of the dimensions of MSI 
over the other, as this would be contrary to ‘justice (adl)’ 
and ‘beneficence (ihsan)’ axiom of IME too. Therefore, 
this paper refers to the unweighted method to fulfil the 
tawhidi expectation.
The calculation of maqasid al-Shari’ah sub-indices 
according to each corollary is completed through the fol-
lowing formula (Haniffa and Hudaib 2007):
where Ii,t,c: Maqasid al-Shari’ah sub-indices of ‘c’ corol-
laries of Najjar’s maqasid of ‘i’ IB in year t; Xi,j: score of 
indicators of ‘i’ IBs in year t; nj: the overall number of indi-
cators in ‘c’ corollaries.
Consequently, the calculation of the overall maqasid al-
Shariah index is based on the following formula:
where Ii,t is the maqasid al-Shari’ah index of the perfor-
mance of IBs i in year t.
As there are eight corollaries in Najjar’s maqasid frame-
work, the sum of all sub-indices on each corollary was 
divided by eight.
Hypotheses Development
The research hypotheses in this study were developed based 
on the literature review, both on the determinants of per-
formance and the disclosure practices of IBs as well as of 
conventional banks and corporations.
There are several factors which may have an impact on 
the economic, social, ethical and environmental performance 
of organizations. For example, Aguinis and Glavas (2012) 
highlight that companies conduct CSR activities due to insti-
tutional, organisational or individual factors. As for social 
reporting of IBs, Farook et al. (2011) analyse the influence 
of both country and IB-specific factors, in which two main 
groups of determinants are considered, including country-
specific factors such as socio-economic development and 
political context and IB-level specific factors.
(1)Ii,t,c =
∑nj
t=1
Xi,j
nj
(2)Ii,t =
∑8
Ii,t,c
8
Fig. 1  The evaluation frame-
work for IBs’ Maqasid 
performance. Source: Adapted 
from Mohammed et al. (2008), 
Bedoui and Mansour (2014) and 
Asutay and Harningtyas (2015)
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As part of the business environment, political and socio-
economic factors shape the environment in which every 
corporation operates, including IBs. Jones (1999) argues 
that a country’s institutional arrangements in politics, law 
and economics along with the level of national develop-
ment can enhance the social responsibility of organiza-
tions, neutrally sustain it or actively resist it. In line with 
this, Yousef (2004) traced the prevalence of ‘murabahah 
syndrome’ in civil law countries with weak institutions and 
non-democratic politics. Farook et al. (2011) outlined that 
within countries where political rights and civil liberties are 
limited, IBs could face lower social expectations and, thus, 
have incentives towards lower social disclosure. In contrast, 
in countries with a higher degree of freedom, IBs provide 
more disclosure to legitimize their existence. Therefore, it 
is expected that the higher a country’s economic and human 
development, the higher the maqasid performance of IBs. 
Meanwhile, the higher the repression of political rights and 
civil liberties along with civil law system, the lower the 
maqasid performance of IBs. Hence, hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 
are defined as follows:
H1: Human development positively affects the maqasid 
performance of IBs;
H2: Political and civil repression negatively influences 
the maqasid performance of IBs;
H3: Civil law based legal systems negatively influence 
the maqasid performance of IBs.
Secondly, the size of the Muslim population in countries 
where IBs operate may influence their maqasid performance. 
Based on the concept of a ‘relevant public’ to whom the 
corporations are accountable, Newson and Deegan (2002) 
found evidence of a positive impact of the size of Muslim 
populations on the social reporting of IBs. Therefore, it is 
expected that the higher the Muslim population, the higher 
the maqasid performance of IBs, as Muslim communities 
could put pressure on IBs to perform better in the ethical, 
social and environmental dimensions of their activities. 
Hence hypothesis 4 is formulated as follows:
H4: The share of the Muslims population in a coun-
try’s total population positively affects the maqasid 
performance of IBs.
As for the third factor, the ownership structure of IBs, Zouari 
and Taktak (2012) indicated that, according to the exist-
ing literature, the ownership structure and concentration 
are crucial factors that impact a company’s financial perfor-
mance and stability. However, they summarise that previous 
empirical studies reported mixed results on the relationship 
between ownership concentration and structure and perfor-
mance. Nevertheless, their empirical study showed that fam-
ily and government ownership of IBs positively influences 
their financial performance, whereas the same impact was 
not found in institutional and foreign shareholders. There-
fore, it is expected that ownership structure either positively 
or negatively affects the maqasid performance of IBs, which 
is stated in hypothesis 5 as follows:
H5: There is a positive relationship between ownership 
structure and the maqasid performance of IBs.
The fourth factor is corporate governance related organiza-
tional structures and the features of the board of directors in 
IBs. Mollah and Zaman (2015) summarised that, according 
to the existing available literature related to all types of com-
panies, there is mixed empirical evidence of the influence 
of governance mechanisms on a company’s performance. 
Nevertheless, their study showed that a board of directors’ 
size and independence are negatively affected by the finan-
cial performance of IBs. In contrast, Zeitoun (2013) identi-
fied that, within several corporate governance features of 
companies, only ‘board independence’ has a significantly 
positive effect on social performance. Thus, based on the 
above rationalisation, it is expected that the corporate gov-
ernance structure may affect the maqasid performance of 
IBs, as identified in hypothesis 6:
H6: There is a positive relationship between corporate 
governance structures and the maqasid performance 
of IBs.
Finally, Shari’ah governance is one of the main features of 
IBs, ensuring that their products and operations are Shari’ah 
compliant, which are mainly presented by SSB features. 
Farook et al. (2011) proposed that SSBs could be a factor for 
CSR activities and social disclosures, and this was deduced 
from the SSBs’ role as promoters of Shari’ah compliance 
and presenters of Islamic laws and principles. Therefore, it is 
expected that the better the Shari’ah governance, the higher 
the maqasid performance of IBs, as stated in hypothesis 7:
H7: Shari’ah governance structures positively affect 
the maqasid performance of IBs.
After identifying the hypotheses, the following section 
explains the panel data model used to examine the factors 
impacting the disclosure performance in relation to maqasid 
al-Shari’ah.
Panel Data Econometric Model
In order to analyse and test the identified hypotheses in line 
with the stated aims, the following linear regression model 
was utilized:
where Ii,t is the Maqasid al-Shari’ah Index and its eight 
corollaries in bank i in year t; PSECi,t is the vector of 
(3)
Ii,t = 훼 + 훽1PSECi,t + 훽2Oi,t + 훽3CGi,t + 훽3SSBi,t + 훽4Ci,t + 휀i,t
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time-varying political and socio-economic context variables; 
Oi,t is the vector of time-varying ownership structure vari-
ables; CGi,t is the vector of time-varying board of directors’ 
variables; SSBi,t is the vector of time-varying SSB variables; 
Ci,t is the vector of control variables; Ɛi,t is the white-noise 
error term.
In this paper, the dependent variable is the maqasid al-
Shari’ah index (MSI), which is constructed by this study and 
calculated as explained above.
The independent variables in this paper are grouped into 
four main categories: (i) political and socio-economic con-
text variables, (ii) corporate governance, (iii) SSB features 
related variables, and (iv) ownership structures of IBs along 
with economic and financial variables, as consistent with 
previous studies.
The political and socio-economic context variables 
include the ‘Human Development Index’1 (HDI, as obtained 
from the UNDP website), ‘political and civil repressions’ 
(PCR, as presented using data from the Freedom in the 
World Index), and the ‘Muslim population ratio’ (MUS-
LIMRATIO, as a percentage of the Muslim population of 
a country using data from the CIA World Factbook). Three 
dummy variables relating to legal systems are ‘common law’ 
(COMLAW is marked ‘1’ if the country uses a common law 
system and ‘0’ if not), ‘civil law’ (‘CIVLAW’ is marked 
‘1’ if the country uses a civil law system and ‘0’ if not) and 
‘Shari’ah law’ (‘SHARLAW’, is marked ‘1’ if the country 
uses an Islamic law system and ‘0’ if not) by using data 
from the JuriGlobe database of Ottawa University. These 
variables are utilised in the existing literature, including by 
Jones (1999) and Farook et al. (2011).
The ‘corporate governance’ variables consists of ‘board 
independence’ (‘INED’ as a percentage of non-executive 
directors in the board of directors), ‘board pro-stakeholders 
directors’ (‘BPSD’ as a percentage of board members, for 
example politicians, academic scholars and others who have 
not held any other positions in the other organizations in the 
same industry), ‘board size’ (‘BS’, as the number of mem-
bers in the board of directors), ‘CEO duality’ (‘CEOD’ is 
marked as ‘1’ if the CEO and chairman are the same person 
and ‘0’ if otherwise) and ‘investment account holders ratio’ 
(‘IAH’ as a percentage of IAHs account deposits to equity). 
It should be noted that these variables have all been utilized 
in previous studies, such as Farook et al. (2011) and Mollah 
and Zaman (2015).
The SSB-related variables are presented by a few indica-
tors as ‘SSB composition’ (‘SSBC’ is marked ‘1’ if the SSB 
consists of more than 3 members and ‘0’ if otherwise), ‘SSB 
disclosure level’ (‘SSBD’ represents the level of compli-
ance of the SSB report with AAOIFI standards) and ‘SSB 
control and monitoring abilities’ (‘SSBCM’ represents the 
average marks of the three components including the number 
of meetings, cross-membership in other IBFs, and the SSBs’ 
audit activities).
As regards to ownership structure, four dummy vari-
ables are included: ‘government owned’ (GOV), ‘family 
owned’ (FAM) ‘institutional’ (INST) and ‘foreign owner-
ship’ (FORG). The respective variables are marked ‘1’ if 
the IBs are owned by such owners. The same variables have 
been used in a previous study by Zouari and Taktak (2012), 
among others.
All the control variables are grouped into bank-specific 
control variables since several IB characteristics may posi-
tively or negatively influence maqasid performance in the 
form of social, economic and environmental performance 
according to previous studies. The control variables included 
in this paper are the ‘IBs’ size of assets’ (SIZE), which is 
presented by a log of the total assets; ‘the leverage level’ 
(LEV), which is measured as the ratio of total debt to equity, 
and the ‘date of incorporation’ (AGE). All these variables 
have been utilized in several studies such as Beck et al. 
(2013), Zouari and Taktak (2012), and Rizkiningsih and 
Dewi (2015).
Furthermore, Gross Domestic Product’ (GDP, as obtained 
from the World Bank) and ‘Financial Development’ (FD 
obtained from IMF) variables are included to capture the 
role of economic growth and financial development, respec-
tively, on the maqasid performance.
Table 2 presents the independent and dependent variables 
and the data sources.
1 HDI is used in this study as an independent variable, which could 
be considered as a universal benchmark. While HDI has limitations in 
addition being the product of Eurocentric worldview, it remains one 
of the best proxies to reflect human development. The observed short-
comings in HDI has not stopped researchers to use it as a variable 
for human development as there is a vast literature in development 
field utilising HDI as a benchmark. Dar (2004), for example discusses 
the shortcomings of HDI and suggests that it should be made more 
humane. In a similar manner, Aydin (2017) proposes an alternative 
Islamic HDI and compares its results with the conventional HDI 
for ten Muslim countries. However, despite being a novel attempt, 
his research again uses benchmarks generated within conventional 
sphere. Similarly, Biggeria et al. (2018) propose a more ‘sustainable’ 
HDI by integrating the environment and freedom. Search, hence, will 
continue to develop a better measure for capturing the human devel-
opment in an integrated manner, while HDI will be a subject for 
many other empirical researches such as Mishra and Nathan (2018) 
and Ngoo and Tey (2019). As the latter study uses HDI as a predictor 
of life satisfaction. Since this study utilises HDI only as an independ-
ent variable to capture the global debate, the philosophical nature of 
the discussion was avoided in the paper, as due to the ontological dif-
ferences, a maqasid index is proposed and developed by this study 
to present a broader human well-being by integrating the other stake-
holders’ interests.
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Generating Data Through Disclosure Analysis
In order to test the hypotheses developed, the annual reports 
of 33 IBs from 12 countries over nine-year period covering 
2008–2016 were utilised for disclosure analysis, with a total 
number of 297 annual reports. The sample selection was 
determined by the availability of the annual reports on the 
IBs’ websites with a preference for large and well-estab-
lished IBs in terms of assets in each country. The choice 
of selecting 12 countries was motivated by the necessity to 
cover a wider range of countries with IB presence along with 
the aim of capturing the impact of different socio-political, 
institutional and human development level contexts. The 
sample of IBs, with such characteristics as being listed or 
non-listed companies, their country of origin, as well as their 
total assets by the end of 2016, are presented in Table 3. 
Since the data generation is based on disclosure index and 
analysis, expanding the sample was not possible due to a 
very large maqasid index with 139 items.
As for the bank-specific, economic and political econ-
omy variables, the Zawya, BankScope, IMF, the UNDP and 
World Bank databases were utilised.
Table 2  Variables and data sources (sample 2008–2016)
a Differ from bank to bank; bdiffer from country to country
Acronym Definition of variables Source Years (available)
Imaqasid Maqasid al-Shari’ah index Eight corollaries 2008–2016
I1 Faith index Annual Reports 2008–2016a
I2 Rights and stakeholding index Annual Reports 2008–2016a
I3 Self-index Annual Reports 2008–2016a
I4 Intellect index Annual Reports 2008–2016a
I5 Posterity index Annual Reports 2008–2016a
I6 Social entity index Annual Reports 2008–2016a
I7 Wealth index Annual Reports 2008–2016a
I8 Environment index Annual Reports 2008–2016a
GDP Gros Domestic Product (log form) The World Bank 1960–2018b
FD Financial Development IMF website 1980–2017b
HDI Human Development Index UNDP website 1990–2018b
PCR Political and civil repression Freedom in the World Index 2005–2018
MUSLIMRATIO A percentage of Muslim ration in the country CIA World Factbook 2008–2016b
COMLAW A common law system JuriGlobe database of Ottawa University 2008–2016
CIVLAW A civil law system JuriGlobe database of Ottawa University 2008–2016
SHARLAW An Islamic law system JuriGlobe database of Ottawa University 2008–2016
INED Board independence as a percentage of non–executive directors 
in the board of directors
Annual Reports 2008–2016a
BPSD Board pro-stakeholders’ directors as a percentage of board 
members
Annual Reports 2008–2016a
BS Board size as the number of members in the board of directors Annual Reports 2008–2016a
CEOD CEO duality Annual Reports 2008–2016a
IAH Investment account holder’s ratio Annual Reports 2008–2016a
SSBC SSB composition Annual Reports 2008–2016a
SSBD SSB disclosure level Annual Reports 2008–2016a
SSBCM SSB control and monitoring abilities Annual Reports 2008–2016a
GOV Government owned bank Annual Reports 2008–2016a
FAM Family owned bank Annual Reports 2008–2016a
INST Institutionally owned bank Annual Reports 2008–2016a
FORG Foreign ownership bank Annual Reports 2008–2016a
SIZE Islamic Banks’ size of assets Annual Reports 2008–2016a
LEV The leverage level which is measured as the ratio of total debt 
to equity
Annual Reports 2008–2016a
AGE The date of incorporation of bank Annual Reports 2008–2016a
 A. Mergaliyev et al.
1 3
Empirical Results of Assessing the Maqasid 
Performance of Islamic Banks and Its 
Determinants
This section presents the empirical results including the dis-
closure performance assessment, the descriptive statistical 
analysis of the evaluations of maqasid performance at the 
individual bank and country levels as well as results of the 
panel data econometric analysis to locate the determinants of 
disclosure. Finally, in ensuring the reliability of the empiri-
cal process, a robustness test was performed; this is also 
presented in this section.
The Maqasid Performance of the Sampled IBs
The first set of analyses in this section examines the maqasid 
performance of each of the sampled IBs, which is sum-
marised in Table 4.2 As can be seen, Safwa Islamic Bank 
(4.8488), Jordan Islamic Bank (2.473), Faisal Islamic Bank 
(Sudan) (1.8896) and PT Bank Syariah Mandiri (Indonesia) 
(1.8087), PT Bank BRI Syariah (Indonesia) (1.4398) are the 
Table 3  Sampled Islamic banks. 
Source: BankScope Database No Bank Country Listed/not listed Total assets (USD) 2016
1 Al-Rajhi Saudi Arabia Listed 90,589
2 KFH Kuwait Listed 53,893
3 DIB UAE Listed 47,643
4 QIB Qatar Listed 38,415
5 ADIB UAE Listed 33,298
6 Alinma Bank Saudi Arabia Listed 27,927
7 Masraf Al Rayan Qatar Listed 25,145
8 Al Baraka Bahrain Listed 23,425
9 Bank Rakyat Malaysia Unlisted 22,117
10 Bank Al Jazira Saudi Arabia Listed 17,685
11 Bank Islami MB Malaysia Unlisted 12,411
12 Ahli United Bank Kuwait Kuwait Listed 12,059
13 Al-Hilal UAE Unlisted 11,824
14 QIIB Qatar Listed 11,689
15 RHB Islamic Bank Berhad Malaysia Unlisted 10,725
16 IBBL Bangladesh Listed 10,138
17 BPM Berhad Malaysia Unlisted 5987
18 Bank Syariah Mandiri Indonesia Unlisted 5867
19 Jordan Islamic Bank Jordan Listed 5773
20 Bank Muamalat Malaysia Unlisted 5314
21 Al Salam Bank Bahrain Listed 4471
22 KFH Bahrain Bahrain Unlisted 4276
23 Meezan Bank Pakistan Listed 4226
24 PT Bank Muamalat Indonesia Indonesia Unlisted 4152
25 Export-Import Bank of Bangladesh Bangladesh Listed 3699
26 Bahrain Islamic Bank Bahrain Listed 2771
27 Faisal Islamic Bank (Sudan) Sudan Unlisted 2378
28 PT Bank BRI Syariah Indonesia Unlisted 2060
29 Al Rayan Bank Plc UK Delisted 1766
30 BankIslami Pakistan Ltd Pakistan Listed 1736
31 Safwa Islamic Bank Jordan Listed 1295
32 Al Baraka Sudan Sudan Listed 408
33 Al-Shamal Bank Sudan Listed 340
2 The full results of the evaluation of the IBs’ performances for each 
component of the maqasid can be made available upon request as due 
to length issue they are not presented here. It should also be noted 
that since certain financial ratios have also been included as part of 
the MSI developed in this study, the scores are higher than 1; how-
ever, normally disclosure analysis scores should be maximum 1.
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five best banks with the highest scores for their maqasid per-
formance, whereas BankIslami Pakistan Limited (0.6438), 
Al-Shamal Bank (Bahrain) (0.5661), KFH Bahrain (0.5243), 
Bahrain Islamic Bank (0.0329) and Al Rayan Bank UK 
(− 0.9155) demonstrated the lowest scores. Overall, except 
for a high dispersion in safeguarding the ‘wealth’ maqasid 
corollary, no best practices were identified in the perfor-
mance of IBs within other maqasid corollaries, which sup-
ports the findings of previous studies including, among oth-
ers, Hassan (2012), Belal et al. (2014), Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2007) and others. Only a few IBs, which are in the top five 
maqasid performers, scored higher than half of the score in 
the maqasid indices.
As regards to country level performance, as can be seen 
in Table 5, Jordan scored the highest average maqasid per-
formance index score of 3.34, followed by Indonesia (1.44) 
and Sudan (1.15). The three countries with a low IB maqasid 
performance index are Kuwait (0.75), Bahrain (0.60) and the 
United Kingdom (− 0.91). Such a low maqasid performance 
from IBs in these two rich GCC countries supports criticism 
of the IBs, namely, that they are ‘delivering a new capitalism 
to the Muslim world’ which is oriented towards financializa-
tion rather than focusing on their social role (Asutay 2012, 
p. 108).
In addition, the performance of IBs per each maqasid 
corollary except I7 (wealth), as IBs are inherently oriented 
towards financial performance, are presented in Fig. 2. As 
can be seen, mostly IBs in Indonesia, Bangladesh, Jordan 
and Pakistan are oriented towards safeguarding the ‘self’, 
‘posterity’ and ‘social entity’ maqasid corollaries, which 
indicates their more active social and developmentalist role 
in these countries as opposed to the IBs in the GCC coun-
tries (Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait) and the UK. These results 
are consistent with Aksak and Asutay’s (2015) findings 
regarding the poor role of IBs in the economic and social 
development of the GCC countries.
Determinants of the Maqasid Performance of IBs: 
Econometric Analysis
Table 6 presents the summary of the descriptive statistics. 
As can be seen, the mean of the overall Imaqasid index is 
approximately 1.0284 while the range of this index is from 
a minimum of − 1.6493 to a maximum of 6.7370. Such wide 
dispersion in the Imaqasid index is due to the wide spread 
of the I7 (wealth) index component (from − 14.0905 to 
49.6030), which indicates that some IBs overperformed in 
financial terms, while others faced significant financial dif-
ficulties during the 2008–2016 period. Although the mean 
of the I7 (wealth) index is approximately 5.2846, the mean of 
the Imaqasid index is significantly lower as a result of the low 
scores in the other maqasid performance indices as compo-
nents of the Imaqasid index. Such indices as I8 (ecology), I4 
(intellect), and I6 (social entity) scored 0.1065, 0.1711 and 
0.4162, respectively, as these indices have minimum zero 
(0) scores, which indicates that some IBs did not undertake 
any actions in these maqasid corollaries during 2008–2016. 
Furthermore, the most surprising finding is the low I1 (faith) 
index mean score (0.3791), which is in contrast to the 
expectation that IBs are niche financial institutions that are 
expected to serve the financial needs of people according to 
Islamic expectations. Thus, low Imaqasid index is an indication 
of the low scores prevailing throughout the sample banks 
and periods as well as dimensions.
Table 5  Overall Maqasid performance of IBs at country level
a Average and change were calculated for 2009–2013
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average % Change 
between 2008 and 
2016
Jordan 2.26 2.23 1.05 2.37 4.22 4.39 4.60 4.47 4.52 3.34 100
Indonesia 1.35 1.66 1.20 2.42 1.10 1.24 1.36 1.31 1.37 1.44 1
Sudan 1.05 1.07 1.20 1.23 0.83 1.21 1.12 1.14 1.50 1.15 43
Bangladesh 1.09 1.07 1.26 1.02 1.03 0.98 1.03 1.02 0.97 1.05 − 3
Qatar 1.46 0.94 0.96 0.90 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.91 0.96 − 38
Pakistan 0.85 0.57 0.49 1.05 1.01 1.06 1.01 1.20 1.11 0.92 31
Saudi Arabia 0.58 1.02 1.07 0.81 0.83 0.83 0.94 1.19 1.03 0.92 78
Malaysia 0.94 0.86 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.87 0.90 0.92 0.93 0.90 1
UAE 0.90 0.75 0.76 0.78 0.79 0.83 0.85 0.86 0.89 0.82 1
Kuwaita – 0.55 0.64 0.66 0.79 0.84 0.83 0.85 0.86 0.75 − 56
Bahrain 0.88 0.46 0.23 0.60 0.22 0.76 1.00 0.79 0.53 0.60 40
UK − 0.75 − 1.64 − 1.12 − 1.29 − 1.18 − 0.80 − 0.69 − 0.56 − 0.20 − 0.91 73
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As can be seen from Fig. 3, the Jarque–Bera, skewness 
and kurtosis coefficients are approximately 37,764.748, 
3.113,241 and 20.08,921, respectively, for the Imaqasid dis-
tribution, which indicates that the distribution is not nor-
mal.3 Nevertheless, a judgment can be made in favour of 
the normal distribution for this particular dependent vari-
able. In addition, according to Brooks (2008, pp. 44, 164), 
an indication of non-normality for the distribution is not a 
significant concern for the purpose of determining the Best 
Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE) estimators using OLS 
if other assumptions are valid. Therefore, non-normality in 
dependent variables is not considered a restriction to our 
regression model.
The efficient conduct of a regression analysis requires 
the absence of multicollinearity; therefore, in this study, 
Pearson’s Correlation was utilised to explore the presence 
of multicollinearity in the relationship between dependent, 
independent and control variables. According to Gujarati 
(2003, p. 359), the pair-wise correlation between explana-
tory variables in excess of ± 0.8 creates a serious multicol-
linearity problem. As presented in Table 7, a significant 
pair-wise correlation can only be found between Imaqasid 
and I7 indices (0.9529), which is not the main aim of this 
study. All other pair-wise correlations between variables 
are found to be less than 0.8, which helps to conclude that 
multicollinearity is not an issue for the pooled regression, 
FEM, REM models presented in this paper.
As this study is based on unbalanced panel data, several 
statistical tests were performed, including the simple OLS 
‘pooled regression’, redundant fixed effect test, the random 
effect model (REM), the fixed effect models (FEM) accord-
ing to the existing literature on econometrics (see: Brooks 
2008; Gujarati 2003) (Table 7).
Tables 8 and 9 present the redundant fixed effect and 
Hausman test, which had the null hypothesis that no cross-
sectional and period specific fixed effects exist, along with 
no significant difference between FEM and REM estimators. 
Since the results reject the null hypothesis, the FEM should 
be considered as an appropriate model for the purpose of 
this study. In addition, following the recommendation by 
Gujarati (2003, p. 418), White’s robust standard errors test in 
FEM was run in order to prevent the potential negative influ-
ence of heteroscedasticity,4 which is also supported by the 
higher adjusted R2 coefficient (0.7134), as shown in Table 10 
as an indicator that a significant part of the variation of the 
Imaqasid index is explained in comparison with other mod-
els. Nevertheless, the empirical results section presents all 
four models (pooled regression, REM, FEM, and FEM with 
robust standard errors test) since Gujarati (2003, p. 651) 
argues that “panel data do not provide a cure-all for all of an 
econometrician’s problem”.
0.0000 0.2000 0.4000 0.6000 0.8000 1.0000 1.2000
Bahrain
United Kingdom
UAE
Sudan
KSA
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Pakistan
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Jordan
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Bangladesh
I8 (Ecology) I6 (Social entity) I5 (Posterity) I4 (Intelect) I3 (Self) I2 (Rights and Stakeholding) I1 (Faith))
Fig. 2  Performance of individual Maqasid dimension of IBs in the sampled countries
3 The results for other variables can be made available upon request 
as due to length issue they are not presented here.
4 The results for the sub-categories can be provided upon request as 
due to length issue they could not be presented here.
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Table 6  Descriptive statistics of 
the variables
N = 274 observations; I1: faith; I2: rights and stakeholding; I3: self; I4: intellect; I5: posterity; I6: social 
entity; I7: wealth; I8: ecology
Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum SD Skewness Kurtosis
Panel A: dependent variables
IMAQASID 1.0284 0.8941 6.7370 − 1.6493 0.9703 3.1132 20.0892
I1 0.3791 0.3816 0.7666 0.0667 0.1624 0.0682 2.2445
I2 0.4201 0.4521 0.7435 0.1274 0.1464 − 0.1247 1.7870
I3 0.6533 0.6324 1.0000 0.0339 0.2902 − 0.1391 1.6326
I4 0.1711 0.1154 0.5614 0.0000 0.1534 0.7019 2.6386
I5 0.7157 0.3853 9.4652 − 1.1011 1.2935 4.3322 24.2664
I6 0.4162 0.4231 0.8462 0.0000 0.2132 0.0264 2.3034
I7 5.2846 4.3555 49.603 − 14.0905 7.2247 3.4466 23.0413
I8 0.1065 0.0000 0.8000 0.0000 0.1926 2.0204 6.1226
Panel B: independent variables
HDI 0.7358 0.7970 0.9200 0.4470 0.1305 − 0.9522 2.4970
GDP 3.4600 1.9900 3.0200 2.2000 5.0100 3.5322 16.9488
FD 0.4202 0.4289 0.8888 0.0877 0.1842 0.0025 2.6331
PCR 10.0100 11.0000 14.0000 2.0000 2.9395 − 0.5984 3.0438
CIVLAW 0.4197 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4944 0.3253 1.1058
COMLAW 0.6313 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4833 − 0.5244 1.2966
SHARLAW 0.9562 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.2050 − 4.4586 20.8791
MUSLIMRATIO 0.7957 0.8120 1.0000 0.0270 0.1886 − 2.1686 9.5258
GOV 0.3293 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.4141 0.7555 1.8363
FAM 0.1614 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.2967 1.4869 3.6759
INST 0.5218 0.5000 1.0000 0.0000 0.3416 − 0.0807 1.8381
FORG 0.2281 0.0000 0.7500 0.0000 0.3040 0.7062 1.7412
INED 0.3600 0.3636 1.0000 0.0000 0.2960 0.3256 2.0693
BPSD 0.1520 0.1538 0.8000 0.0000 0.1607 1.3854 6.0815
BS 9.1368 9.0000 23.0000 0.5000 2.9835 0.6099 5.7906
CEOD 0.9854 1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.1201 − 8.0941 66.5148
IAH 5.8891 5.4995 17.7262 0.0289 3.6230 0.4704 2.4924
SSBC 4.6788 4.0000 14.0000 2.0000 2.2980 2.0235 7.3164
SSBD 0.6124 0.6667 0.8947 0.0000 0.2302 − 1.2476 3.8551
SSBCM 0.6961 0.7500 1.0000 0.0000 0.3295 − 0.8972 2.4606
Panel C: control variables
SIZE 9783.7 4875.616 84,165.24 7.1300 13,865.67 2.7262 11.9245
LEV 8.4968 8.0841 18.0744 0.2049 3.9622 0.1943 2.3506
AGE 21.5 1988 2008 1954 13.3145 − 0.3880 2.5605
Fig. 3  Imaqasid variable distribu-
tion
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Table 8  Result of the redundant fixed effect test
Effects tests Statistics df Prob.
Imaqasid
Cross-section F 12.495505 32,224 0.0000
Cross-section Chi square 280.65104 32 0.0000
Period F 1.352900 7211 0.2270
Period Chi square 10.581073 7 0.0000
Cross-section/Period F 11.359077 40,216 0.0000
Cross-section/Period Chi square 310.316252 40 0.0000
I1 (faith) I5 (posterity)
 Cross-section F 41.94282 32,224 0.0000  Cross-section F 2.102214 32,224 0.0010
 Cross-section Chi square 532.8595 32 0.0000  Cross-section Chi square 71.954453 32 0.0001
 Period F 1.232092 7211 0.0286  Period F 0.472996 7211 0.8535
 Period Chi square 9.654895 7 0.2090  Period Chi square 3.752360 7 0.8078
 Cross-section/Period F 34.655154 40,216 0.0000  Cross-section/Period F 1.772856 40,216 0.0053
 Cross-section/Period Chi square 549.057199 40 0.0000  Cross-section/Period Chi square 77.789961 40 0.0003
I2 (rights and state holding) I6 (social entity)
 Cross-section F 19.60897 32224 0.0000  Cross-section F 31.153776 32224 0.0000
 Cross-section Chi square 365.8827 32 0.0000  Cross-section Chi square 464.625795 32 0.0000
 Period F 2.149829 7211 0.0399  Period F 1.281727 7211 0.2607
 Period Chi square 16.603162 7 0.0201  Period Chi square 10.035851 7 0.1866
 Cross-section/Period F 16.761282 40,216 0.0000  Cross-section/Period F 27.700268 40,216 0.0000
 Cross-section/Period Chi square 386.873690 40 0.0000  Cross-section/Period Chi square 496.801022 40 0.0000
I3 (self) I7 (wealth)
 Cross-section F 27.42565 32,224 0.0000  Cross-section F 15.050472 32,224 0.0000
 Cross-section Chi square 436.4523 32 0.0000  Cross-section Chi square 314.394135 32 0.0000
 Period F 0.352197 7211 0.9286  Period F 1.333725 7211 0.2357
 Period Chi square 2.799581 7 0.9029  Period Chi square 10.434303 7 0.1653
 Cross-section/Period F 22.76942 40,216 0.0000  Cross-section/Period F 13.758269 40,216 0.0000
 Cross-section/Period Chi square 452.60369 40 0.0000  Cross-section/Period Chi square 346.975913 40 0.0000
I4 (intellect) I8 (ecology)
 Cross-section F 16.76641 32,224 0.0000  Cross-section F 15.689253 32,224 0.0000
 Cross-section Chi square 334.9274 32 0.0000  Cross-section Chi square 322.218857 32 0.0000
 Period F 1.544880 7211 0.1537  Period F 1.652824 7211 0.1223
 Period Chi square 12.045613 7 0.0991  Period Chi square 12.865175 7 0.0755
 Cross-section/Period F 15.417663 40,216 0.0000  Cross-section/Period F 12.683760 40,216 0.0000
 Cross-section/Period Chi square 369.736383 40 0.0000  Cross-section/Period Chi square 331.160602 40 0.0000
Table 9  Hausman test results Cross-section random χ2 statistic χ2 df Prob. Conclusion
Imaqasid 27.12853 17 0.0562 H0—not rejected, fixed effect model
I1 (faith) 24.85788 17 0.0979 H0—not rejected, random effect model
I2 (rights and stakeholding) 62.98078 17 0.0000 H0—rejected, fixed effect model
I3 (Self) 47.58493 17 0.0001 H0—rejected, fixed effect model
I4 (intellect) 49.91844 17 0.0000 H0—rejected, fixed effect model
I5 (posterity) 18.40060 17 0.3640 H0—not rejected, random effect model
I6 (social entity) 37.10761 17 0.0033 H0—rejected, fixed effect model
I7 (wealth) 26.07010 17 0.0732 H0—rejected, fixed effect model
I8 (ecology) 132.83777 17 0.0000 H0—rejected, fixed effect model
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Due to the specifics of the FEM model, which inherently 
includes differential intercept dummies, Eviews, the econo-
metrics package, removed four dummy variables (CIVLAW, 
COMLAW, SHARLAW and FORG) in order to prevent a 
‘dummy variable trap’ or perfect collinearity (as stated by 
Gujarati 2003, p. 642).
Table 10 presents the results of the panel data analysis 
using all models for overall maqasid performance index, 
Imaqasid.5 The results are presented in the form of ‘Pooled 
Regression Model’, ‘random effect model (REM)’, ‘fixed 
effect model (FEM)’ and ‘FEM with Robust Standard 
Errors’ for four models. While Model 1 tests all the vari-
ables included in the model with Pooled Regression and 
REM, Model 2 presents the results with FEM and FEM with 
Robust Standard Errors in which CIVLAW, COMLAW, 
SHARLAW and MUSLIMRATIO as well as FORG and 
AGE are excluded. In an attempt to locate the effect of cor-
porate governance (GOV, BPSD, BS and CEOD) on maqasid 
performance by political and socio-economic environment 
(COMLAW, SHARLAW and MUSLIMRATIO), interaction 
variables between the corporate governance and political 
and socio-economic variables are introduced. The results 
for these presented in Table 10 as Model 3 and Model 4 
in a similar way with Model 1 and Model 2. According to 
the results of FEM with the robust standard errors model, 
several political and socio-economic context related vari-
ables, ownership structure, corporate governance, and SSB 
variables all influence the maqasid performance of IBs. Con-
cerning interaction variables in models 3 and 4:
As can be seen, the impact of HDI (− 4.9606) is nega-
tive and statistically significant with p = 0.3529, which con-
firms the finding by Jones (1999); hence hypothesis  H1 is 
not rejected. A possible explanation for this might be the 
active role of the government and regulators in enhancing 
ethical, social and environmental activities by IBs as addi-
tional resource providers for solving country-specific issues 
as well as the customers’ proactive positions. As a result, it is 
expected that IBs in low HDI index countries should expand 
their socio-ethical-economic activities in line with maqasid 
to fulfil the requirements of their regulators, minimize pres-
sure from other stakeholders, and legitimize their role in 
society as active players in solving social and environmental 
problems.
For solving the non-linear relationship between depend-
ent and independent variables, the macroeconomic variables 
of GDP and financial development (FD) were logarithmi-
cally transformed in order to preserve the linear model. The 
results show that FD has a negative significant impact on 
maqāsid (− 0.8180 with p = 0.0974) which is not surprising 
as the financial development variable in market economies 
has been determined by fundamental shifts towards a mar-
ket-based financial system and its stability, but not by social 
expectations. Similarly, re-estimating the panel including the 
interaction variable between corporate governance (INED) 
and political variables (PCR) (PCR*INED), GDP also shows 
a significant negative impact (− 0.8041 with p = 0.0368) on 
maqāsid performance.
As the results depicted in Table 10 demonstrates, MUS-
LIMRATIO (4.8834, p = 0.2563) is one of the main con-
tributors to the higher maqasid performance of IBs, which 
is consistent with previous studies (such as Rizkiningsih and 
Dewi 2015), which implies that hypothesis H4 should not be 
rejected. This can be interpreted as IBs being niche-oriented 
financial institutions, and hence their activities are depend-
ent on the ‘relevant public’ to whom they are accountable.
The last environmental factor which has a negative sign 
and is statistically significant at the 5% level (p = 0.0442) 
is PCR (− 0.0693). This finding agrees with Farook et al.’s 
(2011) findings, which showed that PCR has a nega-
tive impact on the level of social disclosure as a proxy of 
the social activity of IBs. Therefore, hypothesis H2 is not 
rejected by the regression model.
Turning to the ownership and corporate governance 
variables, the results in this study indicate that both the 
INST (− 0.8718 with p = 0.0265) and INED (− 1.2982 with 
p = 0.0117) variables have a negative sign and are significant 
at the 1% level, indicating their impact on maqasid perfor-
mance, while CEOD (0.2327 with p = 0.0869) has a positive 
impact and is significant only at the 10% level. This is in 
contrast to Kunapatarawong and Martinez-Ros (2013), who 
found that institutional pressure has a positive but statisti-
cally insignificant impact on social performance.
The findings in this study show the negative effect of 
institutional investors on overall maqasid-based disclosure 
performance, which might be due to the incentives of insti-
tutional investors to increase benefits by reducing costs on 
social activities, which could result in IBs facing reputa-
tional issues from depositors following the negative impact 
on financial performance. Furthermore, the negative impact 
of institutional investors on financial performance was also 
identified by Zouari and Taktak (2012). The same reasons 
could be suggested for the negative influence of INED vari-
ables as the main objective of INEDs in any board of direc-
tors is mostly to protect the interest of shareholders rather 
than of stakeholders, which may result in INEDs pressuring 
IBs to provide more benefits to shareholders, thus leading to 
a decrease in social activity and indirectly causing the dete-
rioration of the image and financial performance of the IBs. 
However, the findings in this study contrast with Zeitoun 
(2013), who argued that most of the studies found positive 
relationships between board independence and the social 
5 The regression results of the performance for each maqasid corol-
lary can be made available upon request as due to the length of the 
article they could not be presented here.
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performance of corporations. Nevertheless, as the findings 
in the present study indicate, hypotheses H5 and H6 are not 
rejected.
Furthermore, positive but statistically insignificant 
results are found for the GOV and FAM variables, which 
differ with those in Zouari and Taktak’s (2012) study, 
as the latter found a positive and significant relationship 
between these variables and financial performance.
As can be seen in Table 10, two of the three SSB-related 
variables such as SSBC (0.2103) and SSBCM (0.3374) 
have a positive and statistically significant impact with 
p = 0.0087 and p =0.0137 while SSBD (− 0.4447 with 
p = 0.4288) is not statistically significant. These outcomes 
support Farook et al.’s findings (2011) who argued that 
a ‘number of members’ increase monitoring capacity of 
SSB and positively impact the level of Shari’ah compli-
ance in IBs’ activities. Therefore, hypothesis H7 should 
not be rejected.
From the control variables, only LEV (0.0339 with 
p = 0.0622) is found to be statistically significant at the 10% 
level with a positive sign, while SIZE and AGE are found 
to be statistically insignificant, which is consistent with the 
results of Oikonomou et al. (2012). It should be noted that 
for Islamic banking, this implies that the high level of lever-
age is due to higher liabilities as the main source of lever-
age comes from customer deposits (no interbank loans are 
allowed for IBs), which makes IBs concentrate on social and 
ethical aspects in addition to financial performance since any 
deterioration of the public image of IBs may significantly 
impair their financial stability.
The interaction variables between corporate govern-
ance and COMLAW, CIVLAW, and SHARLAW through 
dummy variables were created for Model 3 and Model 4; 
however, none of them were significant. In addition, an inter-
action variable was created between corporate governance 
(INED) and political variable (PCR) (PCR*INED) across 
four regressions in Model 3 and Model 4, which is only sig-
nificant with FEM with Robust Standard Errors in Model 4.
In order to test the robustness of the model, a robustness 
check was performed on the presence of dynamic features in 
the model. We tested the effect of a one-year time lag (− 1) 
on maqasid disclosure performance, as Mirzaei (2011) found 
that the financial performance of IBs is influenced by period 
lag variables. Considering this dynamic behaviour of the 
financial performance of IBs, a separate regression model 
including the time lag variable was run. In this dynamic 
panel data analysis, the findings remained unchanged for 
the HDI, MUSLIMRATIO, and INST independent varia-
bles. However, CEOD and other SSB-related variables were 
found to be statistically insignificant, whereas the results 
were changed for BPSD and BS, both of which were found 
to have a negative impact. Such change may be explained 
by a significant dynamism in changes to the board of direc-
tors while SSB-related variables are mostly stable in IBs. 
Therefore, our main findings remain as stated in the main 
regression model.
To test for potential endogeneity between corporate gov-
ernance performance and socio-economic performance, the 
Durbin–Wu and Hausman tests were applied. In a statistical 
model, endogeneity may occur as a result of joint deter-
mination between independent (corporate governance) and 
dependent (maqāsid) variable, or omitted variables, or if 
there is a correlation between explanatory variables and the 
error term (Greene 2003). The results in Table 10 indicate 
that the F-test is not significant and thus the null hypothesis 
of the Durbin–Wu test cannot be rejected, confirming that 
endogeneity does not represent a problem (Gujarati 2003) 
in this research.
Conclusion
This study explored the maqasid performance of IBs based 
on the argument developed by the IME theoretical frame-
work that the operation of IBs should be driven by the 
maqasid paradigm. With the subsequent identification of its 
main determinants; several hypotheses were developed and 
tested with the data generated from a disclosure analysis 
along with a number of other variables. As a result, several 
important findings were identified.
The findings established by this study show that political 
and socio-economic factors (HDI, PCR and MUSLIMRA-
TIO) as determinants of environmental external influence 
are found to be most significant in their potential impact on 
the maqasid performance of IBs, which indicates that the 
application of the maqasid concept in IB activities is mostly 
dependent on socio-economic realities within the respective 
countries and local communities. At the same time, it may 
also be driven by the main external stakeholders such as 
regulators, depositors and society itself. This implies that IB 
activities are highly dependent on current issues within each 
society, for which each society can contribute in tackling 
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them to gain ‘legitimization’ (Dusuki 2008) for their exist-
ence along with their Shari’ah compliance. In addition, 
facing limitations in their markets along with competition 
from conventional banks, such ‘legitimacy’ could protect 
them from reputational risks and encourage safe deposi-
tors’ to be their customers. Any loss of such ‘legitimacy’ 
could negatively influence the financial performance and 
the stability of IBs as depositors could withdraw their funds 
in cases where Shari’ah compliance is compromised in an 
IB’s operations, as discovered by Chapra and Ahmed (2002). 
Thus, the combined contrasting results of the hypotheses 
regarding the influence of the Muslim population and the 
HDI demonstrate the necessity of understanding the broader 
political and socio-economic realities in order to improve the 
maqasid performance of IBs.
The internal IB-related factors also have a significant 
impact on the maqasid performance of IBs. The identi-
fied issues within ownership structure, and corporate and 
Shari’ah governance should particularly be noted. Whereas 
SSB-related factors positively impact the maqasid perfor-
mance of the sampled IBs (SSBC’s and SSBCM’s coef-
ficients are 0.2103 and 0.3374, respectively), which is 
expected from the authoritative bodies of Shari’ah scholars 
within IBs, these are mitigated by the more significant nega-
tive influence of independent directors (− 1.2982) and insti-
tutional investors (− 0.8718). This alliance of independent 
directors and institutional investors, both of which have the 
same objectives of higher dividends and increased share-
holder value, could influence SSBs to engineer Shari’ah 
compliancy rather than Shari’ah-based decisions or other-
wise restrict the abilities of SSBs or Shari’ah auditors to 
find any non-Shari’ah compliant income to be disposed of 
to charitable social activities, which is one of the elements 
of maqasid performance. Therefore, it could be argued that 
Shari’ah and corporate governance issues within IBs should 
be subject to further review by academic scholars and other 
stakeholders.
In reflecting on this research and the findings, the impor-
tance of embedded faith or the religiosity of leadership 
in actualising IME in the operations of IBs must also be 
acknowledged, as such a quality would consider and locate 
the institution of IBs within its social formation, namely, in 
actualising the maqasid al-Shari’ah expectations. In recent 
years, the burgeoning literature on Islamic leadership, 
including the qualities of leaders vis-à-vis Islam is being 
developed (see: Ali 2009; Beekun 2012; Toor 2008). The 
importance of the quality of ethical or religious leadership in 
ensuring that the vision and mission as well as other aspects 
of the operations of IBs remain within ethically accepted 
frames and produce such outcomes and consequences as 
identified by maqasid al-Shari’ah is crucial. Considering 
that ethical values searched in IBs are the articulation of 
such values of the staff in the organisation, as organisations 
do not have their identity beyond the participants in the insti-
tution. In this spiritually constituted leadership and its artic-
ulations in shaping and effecting the operation of the IBs are 
indeed important. In particular, the distinction between con-
templation and action in religious behaviour (Nasr 1978) and 
its impact on the operations of IBs can be a source of con-
cern in the ethicality of the operations of these banks, which 
is evidenced with the low maqasid performance scores in 
this study and other studies outlined in the literature review 
discussed earlier. However, this research could not delve into 
leadership debates to demonstrate its impact on delivering 
IME expectations as articulated in maqasid al-Shari’ah; as 
that requires another set of variables and measurement issues 
which was not possible to explore within the remit of this 
paper.
A critical reflection should also be provided as to whether 
the disclosed information represents the actual or lived real-
ity. This is valid for all the studies which are based on dis-
closed information, as disclosed information does not imply 
that they have actually been ‘lived’ nor does it represent the 
truth always, as ‘pretentious statements’ can be an issue. 
This, for example, was the case with a number of financial 
companies during the 2008 financial crisis, as their disclosed 
positions indicated that they were in a healthy position while 
in reality their financial state was not healty. In the same 
manner, in the case of voluntary disclosure, ‘non-disclosed 
information’ does not imply that omitted or non-disclosed 
activities have not been ‘lived’ as disclosure is a cultural 
matter and is related to democratic governance practices 
at macro level in a country which have not taken root in 
Muslim countries where Islamic finance has some presence. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that disclosing information at 
individual level relating to charitable giving, for example, 
may not spiritually be considered a good practice within 
Islamic tradition, as ‘whatever the goodness’ is made should 
be kept secret to attain spiritual quality or piety (taqwa). 
However, considering that IBs are corporations which do 
not carry real personality, this spiritual guidance may not 
apply to them.
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In referring to the observed divergence between the aspi-
rations of IME augmented maqasid al-Shari’ah, corporate 
accountability (Zadek et al. 2013) can be considered as 
an important correction mechanism. Therefore, the newly 
emerging Shari’ah audit field should be an important step 
in the right direction. However, the current Shari’ah audit 
practices in IBs still remains within Shari’ah compliance 
or form oriented audit based on fiqh rather than account-
ing for moral consequences of IB operations in the form of 
corporate accountability. Therefore, augmenting the current 
Shari’ah audit practices with the IME paradigm will help 
to develop authentic corporate accountability for IBs (Shafii 
et al. 2015; Shafii and Salleh 2010).
It should also be noted that in a global world where the 
conventional practices beyond Islamic morality is preva-
lent, the meaning of the niche area of maqasid as a measure 
of ethicality can be questioned in terms of its relevance. 
Despite the ontological differences, making references to 
the consequences of each of the prevailing practices such as 
SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals), ESG (Environmen-
tal, Social, Governance), SRI (Socially Responsible Invest-
ment), Impact Investment etc., a common and global under-
standing should be reached. In other words, IME and its 
maqasid consequences are based on Islamic ontology, while 
the consequences produced by maqasid are in line with the 
consequences of SDGs, ESG, SRI and Impact Investment 
(Asutay 2019). Hence, maqasid when presented in a sys-
tematic manner through consequentialism can bring about 
convergence with different practices despite its divine onto-
logical positioning. Nevertheless, the Value Based Interme-
diation for Islamic Financial Institutions proposed in 2017 
by Bank Negara Malaysia (the central bank of Malaysia) can 
be considered as another key development in the right direc-
tion to shape the future of IBFIs in a more humane sense by 
considering the interests of other stakeholders beyond capi-
tal, which is attempted by this study by specifically develop-
ing and testing MSI.
Overall, the findings identified in this study have several 
potential policy implications for IBs and regulators alike. 
While macro-environmental factors are difficult to change, 
improvements in internal corporate and Shari’ah governance 
structures may enhance maqasid orientation and the perfor-
mance of IBs for the benefits of wider stakeholders within 
society. As previous studies have highlighted the advantages 
of a ‘robust Shari’ah governance regime’ (Ahmed 2011c) to 
ensure Shari’ah compliance in IB activities, this study fur-
ther expands this position to strengthen internal SSBs within 
IBs through regulations from relevant national Shari’ah bod-
ies or regulators for the purpose of increasing the social, 
ethical, environmental and financial performance of IBs 
rather than just being limited to serving shareholder needs.
In particular, the findings related to the board of direc-
tors’ and SSBs’ influence on maqasid disclosure perfor-
mance could be further investigated, especially consider-
ing the ‘conflict’ between their objectives, as the board of 
directors should serve the interests of shareholders while 
SSBs should protect the interests of a wider group of stake-
holders. Therefore, the application of game theory in cor-
porate and Shari’ah governance could be an interesting 
subject for future research. In relation to this, the regulation 
of Shari’ah-related issues in different jurisdictions and its 
indirect influence on maqasid performance is also worthy of 
empirical investigation.
In concluding, since maqasid al-Shari’ah provides 
endogenous norms for IBs to shape their operations with, 
the findings revealed in this study clearly delineates that 
IBs have not yet shaped their operations in line with the 
expected maqasid outcomes. While IBs have demonstrated 
unprecedented success in their financial transformation in 
the form of asset accumulation, financial performance and 
institutional and geographic diffusion, their main objective 
of contributing to social good in the creation of ‘good’ or 
‘ihsani’ society, namely, societal transformation, is yet to 
be fulfilled.
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itm
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e n
ee
ds
 of
 
M
us
lim
 co
m
m
un
ity
Ha
ni
ffa
 an
d H
ud
aib
 (2
00
7)
Co
m
m
itm
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itm
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l c
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o s
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i’a
h S
ec
tio
n 
in
 A
R
Sh
ar
i’a
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l t
ra
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l t
ra
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n o
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l t
ra
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s f
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 re
as
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s f
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l t
ra
ns
ac
tio
ns
Be
lal
 et
 al
. (
20
14
)
Op
in
io
n o
f S
SB
 re
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r o
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l o
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ra
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ra
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r C
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d f
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f D
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d f
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d f
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d f
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d f
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s f
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n c
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d c
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 D
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y f
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e C
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m
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 D
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d r
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d m
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d m
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 m
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d m
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s d
ive
rse
?
UK
 C
GC
 (F
RC
 20
14
)
Nu
m
be
r o
f m
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f m
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g c
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e b
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e b
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s b
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 C
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ra
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e b
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h m
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